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INTRODUCTION
This paper will keep company with others that consider the
regulation of over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives, and the particular
role and potential effectiveness of proposals in the new regulatory
regimes that have emerged since the recent financial crisis (or crises,
depending on how you count) for central clearing as a means of
mitigating systemic risk.1

† This paper is based on a keynote address to securities regulators delivered at the 36th

Annual IOSCO Conference held in Cape Town, South Africa, in April 2011. The paper
has been updated to include, among other things, a description of P.R.I.M.E. Finance,
the financial markets tribunal and disputes center, which opened for business January
16, 2012.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Komadhi
Mardemootoo, a former student at the London School of Economics and Political
Science, in preparing this paper for publication.
* Visiting Professor, London School of Economics and Political Science; Chairman,
The P.R.I.M.E. Finance Foundation; Retired Founding Partner, US Law Practice, Allen
& Overy LLP.
1. See Joanne P. Braithwaite, Private Law and the Public Sector’s Central
Counterparty Prescription for the Derivatives Markets, (LSE Legal Studies Working
Paper No. 2/2011, 2011), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/
WPS2011-02_Braithwaite.pdf.
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However, in what follows, I want the reader to think outside the
current regulatory debate for a moment. Instead, I would ask the reader
to pause while contemplating the subject of systemic risk in the global
financial markets and consider how courts and judges fit in.
I. THE COURTS AS HOSPITALS
Our newspapers are full of articles about financial market
regulation. Parliamentarians and congressmen do not shy away from
weighing in on this subject too. Financial regulation can be seen as a
kind of ‘preventive medicine,’ and we attach great importance to getting
it right.
That is as it should be. Preventive medicine in matters of both
personal and financial health is important. In the recent crisis, the
malaise afflicting the financial markets had arguably reached epidemic
proportions. Financial market participants were, and some still are,
seriously, if not terminally, ill. Moreover, we can expect more accidents
to occur and more victims to surface in the future. However, as the
courts are our ‘hospitals,’ perhaps we should worry more about the
condition of the courts and whether we have enough qualified staff for
them.
It is indeed a little surprising that with all the debate about the
future of financial regulation and the statements on the subject that
politicians, regulators, economists and academics make—and even
statements by the legal profession itself—so little attention has been
paid to the role of our judges in mitigating risk. After all, judges around
the world interpret regulations, fill in the legislative and regulatory gaps,
and resolve ambiguities. In addition, they can be expected to settle any
number of financial market disputes—some of them highly complex and
technical—that are likely to follow from the considerable losses, and in
some cases the demise, of major financial institutions and their
counterparties.
This paper aims to address an apparent gap in the debate. What
role should we wish to see our courts play in dealing with complex
financial instruments, disputes arising from the financial crisis, and, in
due course, matters requiring interpretation of the new regulatory
regime? Are the courts, as currently constituted, equipped to play that
role? Is there more that the markets, the regulatory community, and the
legal profession can do to ready them?
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II. WHY COURTS ARE IMPORTANT
Why are courts relevant to discussions about financial market
systemic risk? Well, for a start, courts are potential allies of regulators
in the battle to safeguard our financial markets from systemic risk.
Courts in the United States and elsewhere have ‘fleshed out’ securities
regulation in the past, thereby promoting legal certainty and, as a result,
contributed to market stability. That is why, as law students and young
lawyers, although we were taught black letter law and we read
regulations, we spent a lot more time reading and studying cases. When
addressing questions such as, “How much due diligence should I do in
connection with this IPO?”, we looked to the cases: in one such case we
read what one lawyer did (poor young Stanton)—and it wasn’t enough;
while another told the story of a lawyer who did do enough. The cases
showed the way to the ‘safe harbors’ into which to sail, gave examples
of ‘shipwrecks’ as a warning along the way, and, most importantly,
related the principles of law and regulation to real world facts. The facts
will change, and the facts are always important.
Intelligently interpreting financial market regulations in light of
new facts will continue to be important. Judges who understand finance
can do this. Therefore, the courts can potentially play an important role
in the battle against financial market systemic risk. However, when it
comes to the derivatives markets and complex product litigation, the
courts can also be a source of systemic risk. I will tell you why I think
that and suggest steps to address this issue. However, first I will discuss
two more reasons why I think this issue—the role of the courts—is so
important for derivatives product regulation and complex product
litigation.
A. THE STAKES ARE HIGH
The stakes are high. The amount of money at risk is staggering.
The Bank for International Settlements estimates the current size of the
OTC derivatives market alone in terms of notional amounts outstanding
at approximately $639 trillion.2 More than 90% of this amount is
governed by a single standard form contract and terms.3
2. Statistics Release: OTC Derivatives Statistics at end-June 2012, BANK OF INT’L
SETTLEMENTS (Nov. 13, 2012), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1211.htm.
The notional amounts reported are a measure of derivatives market activity and reflect
both new and existing transactions. These amounts, however, are not a measure of risk.
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A ‘tsunami’ of financial markets litigation from the financial crisis
had been predicted, and the cases are pouring in.4 In one pending court
case, $1.5 billion is in dispute. The outcome of this case may turn on
the court’s interpretation of two words in the parties’ ISDA Master
Agreement. Therefore, it is important that the decisions in major
financial market cases and the precedent these cases produce are correct.
B. THE STUFF IS COMPLICATED
The contracts, issues, and products are all complicated,5 and thus
far the track record of the courts is not in all cases satisfactory. For
example, the financial crisis ushered in contradictory court decisions
from cases based on similar facts, even as between New York and
English courts.6 Thought of globally, these courts represent a decentralized system, with no Supreme Court to settle contradictory
opinions and provide clear precedent.
The markets worry all the time: wrong place, wrong party, judges
and lawyers who would brief them who don’t get it. The nature of the
cases is also evolving from addressing issues with which judges have
historically been both familiar and comfortable—such as authority (ultra
vires), whether a contract formed and, if so, on what terms, the
relationship between the counterparties or whether one party owed and

The marked-to-market values of outstanding trades and the estimated credit exposure
after netting would be significantly less, although still measured in trillions of dollars.
3. The forms are published by the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association, Inc. (formerly, the International Swaps Dealers Association, Inc. and,
together, “ISDA”). ISDA first published forms of its core master agreement in 1987,
and since then the forms have been revised and re-published twice (1992 and 2002).
4. For a long list of parties and cases resulting from the failure of just one
financial institution in 2008, see Parties, LEHMAN SECURITIES LITIGATION, available at
at http://www.lehmansecuritieslitigation.com.
5. Jonathan Ross, The Case for P.R.I.M.E Finance: P.R.I.M.E Finance Cases, 7
CAP. MARKETS L. J. 221, 223–26 (2012). According to the author, the community of
professionals and jurists with a deep understanding of the issues, however, is quite
limited at present.
6. See, e.g.,Belmont Park Invs. Pty. Ltd. v. BNY Corporate Tr. Servs. Ltd. &
Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc., [2011] UKSC 38. Cf. In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.
422 B.R. 407 (Bankr., S.D.N.Y. 2010). See generally Ross supra note 5, at 259.
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satisfied its duty of care7—to novel and more technical issues, like
flawed asset and anti-deprivation theories,8 mathematical modeling,
formulaic calculations, and global insolvency-proofing techniques.
The remedies in the derivatives markets, for example, are very
different from the remedies of the loan and bond markets, even though
the contemplated cash flows may be similar.9 As a result, the cases may
be especially challenging for judges without considerable familiarity
with the relevant industry contracts. Additionally, global market facts
and trade usage are highly relevant and must be understood and
accounted for. Judges need an appetite for, and understanding of,
comparative law and practice, as well as international finance. There is
little to demonstrate a propensity for this across all the courts that find
complex product litigation before them.
C. STANDARDIZATION
In addition to these two factors—high stakes and complexity—
there is a third factor of particular importance: standardization.
Widespread usage of master agreements and standard terms across
geographical, cultural and language divides, has great benefits,
including legal certainty and huge cost efficiencies. We do not have a
world parliament to legislate such matters, but the markets have created
a kind of global law by contract.10 However, the use of such contracts
creates significant risk. The widespread usage of the same terms can
amplify a court’s mistake in deciding a term’s proper meaning.11
“Whoosh”—that mistake goes around the globe, affecting trillions of
7. See, e.g., Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough
Council [1994] A.C. 669; Bankers Trust Int’l PLC v. PT Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera, PT
Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera v. Bankers Trust Int’l PLC and another (1996) C.L.C. 518.
8. See sources cited supra note 6.
9. There is the risk that when a non-expert court lacks familiarity or experience
with derivatives and other complex financial products, the judge may be tempted to recharacterize such ‘new’ products and treat them as something more familiar (like loans
or even traditional insurance contracts) but in essence different from what the parties
originally intended to create.
10. See Annelise Riles, The Anti-Network: Private Global Governance, Legal
Knowledge, and the Legitimacy of the State, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 605 (2008).
11. Stephen J. Choi & C. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute 104 MICH L. REV. 1129,
1130–73 (2006). The authors suggest that standard form contracts, if in widespread
use, may be “better viewed as akin to statutes” and should accordingly be interpreted as
such. Id. at 1130. See also Ross, supra note 7 at 241–46 for another discussion on
interpretation.
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dollars of trades.12 As a result, the market (i.e., parties outside the
dispute) may have a greater interest in the outcome of a particular case
than the two private parties who are litigating it.13
Moreover, the parties to a dispute may not spot an issue of
importance to the markets. Or, having spotted it, they may have
difficulty finding the requisite experts to give evidence in court. The
parties may not wish to, or may be unable to, spend what it takes to get a
right answer. There may be other strategic reasons why a party may not
frame or develop an issue that others in the market view as extremely
important.
There are other challenges too. Knowledgeable counsel may be
conflicted. Additionally, third party briefs may not be available or even
admissible in certain jurisdictions,14 so that it may be difficult to get a
market or regulator’s view in the proceedings. Collectively, all these
possibilities may be a source of systemic risk, particularly where there is
commonality of standard contracts and trading terms in what constitutes
a global market.

12. For instance, concern was expressed by ISDA over a series of recent rulings in
the Seoul Central District Court in relation to Knock-in Knock-out (“KIKO”) currency
option cases, citing “fundamental misconception” on the part of the court and the risk of
“upsetting financial stability” if the decisions were upheld. See Press Release, ISDA
Expresses Concern over KIKO Case Rulings (Apr. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.isda.org/press/press040109.html. See also Hazell v. Hammersmith &
Fulham London Borough Council [1992] 2 A.C. 1 (H.L) (appeal taken from Eng.), and
Peregrine Fixed Income Ltd. (In Liquidation) v. Robinson Dep’t Store Pub. Co. Ltd.
(2000) ALL E.R. (D) 1177, which provoked similar reactions.
13. Choi & Gulati, supra note 11, at 1132 (“[D]eference to the intentions of the
specific parties before a court is especially inappropriate where there are third party
effects.”)
14. In certain cases, an amicus type brief can help bridge the knowledge gap. See,
e.g., In re Nat’l Gas Distributors, LLC, 556 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2009). This case
involved the first major interpretation of the Financial Netting Improvements Act of
2006 and Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. ISDA
played an amicus role at all stages through the appeal of the case to the US Court of
Appeals. For an example from the English courts, where the use of amicus briefs is
more restricted, see Lomas and others v. JFB Firth Rixson Inc. (2012) EWCA Civ 419.
In the Lomas proceedings, ISDA perceived that they had a legitimate interest in the true
construction of their standard terms and applied for, and were granted, leave to
intervene both at first instance and in the appeal of the lower court decision. In the
judgment given, the appeals court appears to have relied upon and been largely
persuaded by ISDA’s submissions.
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Can we see, as a result, a blurring of lines in the kind of cases I am
describing? Lines that have traditionally, at least in common law courts,
divided civil from criminal procedure. Consider the following: A shoots
B and stands trial; B forgives A, but the state objects, noting the state’s
issue with people using guns to settle disputes and the need to protect
public interest. It is not for the private citizen alone to decide to settle
this case, but rather for the state to decide.
Now that we have seen considerable systemic consequence from
market defaults—not only for counterparties, but also for a wide range
of stakeholders, including pensioners and taxpayers—do we need a
better way of ensuring that the wider market interest in such cases is
similarly protected?
Standard global contracts, like the ISDA master agreements,
function more like treaties or statutes.15 However, unlike most
important treaties, until now no court or tribunal is specifically
dedicated to interpreting them. It would be meaningless, when
interpreting the provisions of such contracts to ask, “What did the
parties intend?” The answer is probably that they intended what the
market working groups in some room, possibly long ago, intended—
rooms in which the contracting parties were not present and perhaps not
represented. We need experienced judges who know these answers or at
least have a good grasp of the context in which the contract must be
read.
II. SETTLED LAW AND GLOBAL MARKETS
(1) We need a settled body of law for the global financial markets.
We need at least to learn from our mistakes. We need to nurture a
collective, and probably specialist, wisdom about the issues in these
cases.
(2) This is a very international affair—a particularly global business.
We are apt to see two counterparties (for example, an African
commodity producer hedging its risk with a European bank), each
possibly from a civil code jurisdiction, each possibly a native French
speaker, but using an English language, common law contract (like the
ISDA Master). Ideally, we would want judges who literally speak the
language of the parties, and with a strong comparative law background.

15.

See Choi & Gulati, supra note 11.
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Is it correct that the parties should need to fly off to London or New
York to settle their disputes? Even if the judgments of those courts are
not enforceable in either party’s home jurisdiction?16
So, with decentralized courts, decentralized parties, common law
contracts, civil code country players (or perhaps Islamic finance
inspired), and complicated cases, there is a serious potential for wrong
results, and of disaster stemming from those wrong results. What can
we do about this? What would move things forward in a more positive
way?
III. P.R.I.M.E. FINANCE INITIATIVE
Well, I hope that it will be good news that some of us are trying,
proactively, to make a difference. In late October 2010, on a Monday
following a weekend meeting of G-20 finance ministers in Seoul, a
group of sixty senior experts quietly gathered in the Peace Palace in The
Hague to discuss this very issue. The meeting was convened by Lord
Woolf, the former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, with
support from the Dutch authorities.
There were twenty legal
practitioners representing five centuries of “lawyer years” counseling in
the derivatives markets.
There were another twenty from the
market: CEOs, CLOs, dealers, buy-side, several (including the first)
Chairmen of ISDA and of other relevant trade bodies. Additionally, the
President of the Dutch Central Bank, the Chairman of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, senior figures (participating in their
individual capacities) from the European Central Bank, the Federal
Reserve and the SEC, and some of the leading academics in the field,
were also present.
But perhaps most importantly, senior judges attended the meetings.
The judges came from the Delaware Supreme Court, the Australian
Federal Court, the New Zealand Court of Appeals and other national
courts. We worked hard then and, with continued Dutch government
support, we have worked hard since. I am pleased to report the

16. For a reporting of growing concerns in the financial markets about the
enforceability of foreign court decisions in relevant jurisdictions, see for example,
Memorandum for Members of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association,
Inc: The use of arbitration under an ISDA Master Agreement, ISDA (Jan. 19 2011),
available at http://www.isda.org/uploadfiles/_docs/FLRC_ISDA_Arbitration_Memo_
Jan11.pdf. (hereinafter “ISDA Memorandum”).
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formation of a Panel of International Market Experts in Finance (or
“P.R.I.M.E. Finance”) devoted to complex product and other financial
market disputes, offering arbitration and mediation services, and
committed to providing training for judges in national courts, expert
testimony and advisory opinions as well.
On January 16, 2012, Jan Kees De Jager, the then Finance Minister
of the Netherlands, opened the P.R.I.M.E. Finance Disputes Center in
The Hague.17 It is already a truly international panel of the senior legal
and market experts in the field. There are nearly 100 experts currently
on the panel representing collectively more than 2,500 years of relevant
experience.18 (There is also a “wait list” of an even greater number of
nominee experts, many with impeccable credentials, lined up to help,
and it is expected that the panel will continue to grow and broaden the
diversity of its representation.)
Diversity is also key because P.R.I.M.E. Finance hopes to play an
important role in the resolution of financial market disputes where one
or both parties is from a developing economy jurisdiction.
Traditionally, many industry standard contracts have included clauses
referring disputes to the courts of New York or England. However, the
decisions of these courts may not be enforceable in many jurisdictions
where the parties may be organized or trade pursuant to these standard
terms. By virtue of the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, P.R.I.M.E. Finance arbitral awards can
be enforced in many such jurisdictions.19
Now, have we “put our heads in the sand” with respect to central
clearing and its relevance to the reduction of systemic risk as well?
With all the focus on central counterparties and clearing, there is
growing concern that dispute settlement between clearinghouses and

17. The opening of P.R.I.M.E. Finance attracted considerable media attention. See,
e.g., Caroline Binham, Financial Tribunal Opens to Settle Disputes, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2012, available at, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/550ea69a-3f8e-11e1-880900144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss#axzz1jbCG84W3; Alison Ross, PRIME time, GLOBAL
ARB. R. (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/30091/
prime-time/. For a fuller listing of relevant press coverage and articles, see
http://www.primefinancedisputes.org/
index.php/news-blog/press-coverage, including earlier coverage in THE ECONOMIST,
THE TIMES, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, FINANCIAL TIMES, GUARDIAN, THE AMERICAN
LAWYER and in newspapers in China, Japan, Russia, the Netherlands, Kuwait, Brazil,
Greece, Slovakia and Ukraine.
18. See Ross, supra note 7 at 227–29.
19. See ISDA Memorandum, supra note 16.
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their members, and between clearing houses across jurisdictions, has
been given short shrift. We know that there are some very thorny legal
issues lurking, many still untested. Many also believe the less
sophisticated procedures and rule books used by clearinghouses in the
past are unlikely to be fully up to the task of settling these disputes.20
Yet the decisions in future may have greater systemic consequence. A
panel of prepared international experts could mitigate the risk of
unsatisfactory results from dispute settlement efforts at and between
clearinghouses and exchanges.
In attracting talent to its rather ambitious task, the P.R.I.M.E.
Finance Disputes Center is taking full advantage of a sociological
phenomenon: a generation of market participants and their advisors—
the real experts in this field—are reaching retirement age. They built
the legal theory and infrastructure of the derivatives and structured
finance industry through the formative years of the business. They
understand it. And many of them are prepared to give back. Many of us
thought it would be a shame to let this opportunity slip by.
CONCLUSION
Financial market law litigation is probably increasing. It is
certainly complicated. And, partly because of standard contracts and
terms, and the volume of trading, wrong decisions threaten systemic
risk. In this sense at least, the interest of the markets in the outcome of a
case may be far greater than the interest of the parties to that case.
The current reliance on national tribunals of general jurisdiction
and ad hoc arbitration is unsatisfactory. It is too decentralized, too
inefficient and too expensive, and, perhaps most importantly, it is failing
to produce a settled and authoritative body of law or the predictability
that the markets crave and on which financial stability may depend.
Let me leave the reader with a question: why do we have special
subject matter courts for everything from family law to trade to tax and
insolvency—but in most jurisdictions at national level, we do not have
dedicated courts for finance? Think about it. World trade benefits from
the existence of the WTO tribunal and the dedicated bar it has nurtured.
Why then, until now, has there been no institutionalised international
20. For a recent article calling for “detailed scrutiny of [central counterparties’]
dispute resolution processes,” see Joanne P. Braithwaite, OTC Derivatives, the Courts
and Regulatory Reform, 7 CAPITAL MARKETS L. J. 364, 379 (2012).
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dispute settlement mechanism for finance? Is international finance law
any less global, complicated or systemically relevant than international
trade law? I don’t think so.
Judges who understand finance can be allies of the regulators and
play an important role in fighting systemic risk in the financial markets.
Absent an available and ready supply of persons expert enough to play
this role, and to train and assist others to do so, too many of the judges
around the world, if called upon to decide complex product cases and
interpret standard contracts and terms that govern derivatives and other
financial product trading, may represent a source of such systemic risk.
P.R.I.M.E. Finance aims to make a positive difference in this respect.
We must do everything that we can to foster an authoritative and settled
body of financial market law and a better understanding of key financial
market contracts and relevant financial market practice. It would be
dangerous to put all our eggs in the single basket of better regulation.

